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THE COMPLEX LEGACY OF R. V. CUERRIER:
HIV NONDISCLOSURE PROSECUTIONS AND THEIR
IMPACT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT LAW
ISABEL GRANT*
This article examines the impact of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Cuerrier
from two vantage points. First, the article examines the impact of the decision on HIV
nondisclosure prosecutions. Second, it examines the damage done by Cuerrier to sexual
assault law outside of the HIV context. The article argues that Cuerrier has both
overcriminalized people living with HIV and distorted the law of sexual assault. Through
Cuerrier, and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has unduly limited the
concept of consent and its voluntariness requirement, and distorted the concept of fraud
such that deceptions around sex are only criminalized where they cause a significant risk
of serious bodily harm. It is argued that legislatively removing HIV nondisclosure
prosecutions from the scope of sexual assault offences, and making corresponding changes
to the definition of consent, is the only way to remedy the harm done to people with HIV and
to sexual assault law more generally.
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I. INTRODUCTION
HIV nondisclosure prosecutions began in the late 1980s in Canada at a time when fear,
misinformation, and discrimination against people living with HIV were rampant and when
treatment options for HIV were extremely limited. At the same time that HIV/AIDS was
emerging into public consciousness, the 1980s also saw significant feminist-inspired law
*
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reform in the area of sexual assault generally. These two trends intersected in 1998 when the
Supreme Court of Canada decided in R. v. Cuerrier1 that HIV nondisclosure could be
prosecuted as a form of assault or sexual assault. As a result, Cuerrier has left a complex
legacy. On the one hand, the law provides a conviction for aggravated sexual assault for
someone who fails to disclose their HIV status to a sexual partner, unless the accused both
used a condom and had a low viral load. On the other hand, the law of sexual assault outside
of the HIV context has also been impacted by Cuerrier with the doctrine of fraud now being
conceptualized almost entirely through a lens of the risk of disease transmission and
unwanted pregnancy. This focus ignores the more common and sometimes intricate
deceptions that mostly men engage in to deceive their sexual partners. Further, the scope of
consent — that is, the voluntary agreement to engage in the sexual activity in question — has
been limited as a result of the Supreme Court’s apparent concern about extending HIV
nondisclosure prosecutions even further than it had already done. In this article, I argue that
the only way to right the ship is to remove HIV nondisclosure prosecutions from sexual
assault and to refocus the law of sexual assault on protecting the autonomy and equality of
complainants who, overwhelmingly, are women and girls.2
This article presents the legacy of Cuerrier from two very different vantage points. In the
first part, I retrace the history of HIV nondisclosure prosecutions in Canada to demonstrate
how we got to this point. The 1998 decision in Cuerrier marked the turning point in HIV
nondisclosure cases, as lower courts had until then resisted the attempt to squeeze these
prosecutions into the sexual assault category. In 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada in R.
v. Mabior3 had an opportunity to change directions but instead doubled down and expanded
the scope of criminalization of people living with HIV. Following Mabior, some courts have
attempted, with varying success, to limit the impact of that decision to avoid prosecuting
persons who create little or no risk of harm. In the second part of the article, I switch gears
to look at Cuerrier’s legacy from a different vantage point by examining how this case has
impeded the effective prosecution of sexual assault cases outside of the HIV context. I
demonstrate that the decision in Cuerrier has in fact narrowed the definition of consent in
sexual assault cases and left us with an inadequate concept of fraud which puts too much
weight on the risk of serious bodily harm. I conclude by arguing that the prosecution of HIV
nondisclosure as sexual assault benefits no one; it does not prevent the spread of HIV in any
meaningful way, it forces people with HIV to live with the threat of criminalization hanging
over their lives, and it has left Canadians with a weaker version of consent in the context of
sexual assault more generally.

1
2

3

[1998] 2 SCR 371 [Cuerrier].
Of all reported sexual assaults in Canada, 87 percent of victims are female. See Statistics Canada,
Police-Reported Sexual Assaults in Canada, 2009 to 2014: A Statistical Profile, by Cristine Rotenberg,
Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 3 October 2017) at 3, online: <www150.statcan.gc.
ca/n1/en/pub/85-002-x/2017001/article/54866-eng.pdf?st=kE1XsIEm>.
2012 SCC 47 [Mabior SCC].
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II. CUERRIER’S LEGACY FOR PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV
A.

THE TRAJECTORY OF HIV NONDISCLOSURE
PROSECUTIONS IN CANADA

After two decades of experience with highly active antiretroviral treatment (HAART),
HIV is now a treatable chronic illness which is not necessarily a life-threatening condition.4
This was not the case in 1989 when prosecutions of HIV nondisclosure began. Acquiring
HIV at that time almost inevitably led to death.5 The fact that HIV was associated with
already marginalized communities, such as gay men and injection drug users, compounded
the stigma surrounding HIV and hindered the government response. Our understanding of
HIV transmission was also in its infancy and there was considerable misinformation
suggesting that the virus was more easily transmitted than was in fact true.6
Just four years before HIV nondisclosure prosecutions began in Canada, Parliament had
amended the Criminal Code, removing the provision which had until that point criminalized
the negligent transmission of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) as a summary conviction
offence.7 The repeal of this provision left the regulation of STIs to the public health system
rather than to criminal law. As a result, prosecutors who wanted to charge individuals for
HIV nondisclosure were required to make this behaviour fit into other existing crime
categories which were not drafted with HIV nondisclosure in mind.
The first prosecution for HIV nondisclosure took place in 1989 in R. v. Summer, where
the accused was convicted of common nuisance and sentenced to one year of incarceration
for failing to disclose his status to a number of female partners.8 Fast forward thirty years,
to a time where we have made tremendous gains in treating and preventing the spread of HIV
but where people can still be convicted of Canada’s most serious sexual crime, aggravated
sexual assault, punishable by a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, for failing to
disclose their HIV positive status. It is almost impossible to explain this trajectory in light
of the developments in the science of HIV. According to the 2018 “Expert Consensus
Statement on the Science of HIV in the Context of Criminal Law,” it is not possible for HIV
to be transmitted in a single sex act including anal or vaginal intercourse if a condom (male
or female) is used correctly.9 The United States Centers for Disease Control has established

4
5
6
7
8

9

See Steven G Deeks, Sharon R Lewin & Diane V Havlir, “The End of AIDS: HIV Infection as a Chronic
Disease” (2013) 382:9903 Lancet 1525.
See Paroma Basu, “Forgotten Lessons” (2010) 466:7304 Nature S14.
See e.g. William H Masters, Virginia E Johnson & Robert C Kolodny, Crisis: Heterosexual Behaviour
in the Age of AIDS (New York: Grove Press, 1988).
Criminal Code, RSC 1906, c 146, s 316A, as repealed by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, SC 1985,
c 19, s 42.
R v Summer (1990), 98 AR 191 (Prov Ct) [Summer]. HIV nondisclosure was also an issue in an earlier
decision involving a man convicted of common nuisance for donating blood when he knew he was HIVpositive but did not disclose this fact. See R v Thornton, [1989] OJ No 1814 (QL) (Dist Ct); R v
Thornton (1991), 1 OR (3d) 480 (CA); R v Thornton, [1993] 2 SCR 445.
See Françoise Barré-Sinoussi et al, “Expert Consensus Statement on the Science of HIV in the Context
of Criminal Law” (2018) 21:7 J Intl AIDS Society 1 at 3–4. See also Mona Loutfy et al, “Canadian
Consensus Statement on HIV and its Transmission in the Context of Criminal Law” (2014) 25:3 Can
J Infectious Diseases & Medical Microbiology 135.
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the risk of transmission for someone with an undetectable viral load as “effectively no
risk,”10 yet our law continues to lag behind the scientific reality.
The federal government has steadfastly declined to amend the Criminal Code to preclude
or limit these prosecutions.11 In December 2018, the federal government did issue a directive
to limit HIV nondisclosure prosecutions,12 but the use of the directive meant that its
applicability was limited to the territories where federal prosecutors are responsible for
Criminal Code prosecutions and where relatively few HIV nondisclosure prosecutions have
taken place.13 The directive indicates that federal prosecutions will not be initiated where the
person living with HIV has maintained a suppressed viral load, and that prosecutors will
“generally not prosecute” where a person used a condom, engaged only in oral sex, or was
taking treatment as prescribed, unless other risk factors were present.14 In addition, at least
one feminist group has now officially urged that these prosecutions be taken out of Canada’s
sexual assault law,15 a position that HIV advocates have urged for years.16 A consensus is
emerging that Canada’s criminal law is too harsh, potentially punishing those who present
no real risk of HIV transmission, and targeting highly marginalized and disproportionately
racialized persons.17 Yet, aside from the above mentioned directive, our government has been
unwilling to respond.
B.

HOW WE GOT HERE

After Summer’s conviction in 1989, considerable uncertainty existed in Canada as to what
crime was the appropriate vehicle for such prosecutions. It was as if prosecutors across the
country decided that HIV nondisclosure needed to be criminalized, but no one was exactly
sure how. In the early cases, judges resisted extending the doctrine of fraud vitiating consent
to sex to cover HIV nondisclosure, thus ruling out sexual assault-based offences.18 In a
prominent Ontario case, Ssenyonga, the judge declined to extend fraud vitiating consent to
include HIV nondisclosure.19 In response to the Crown’s argument that consent should be
vitiated on public policy grounds, Justice McDermid expressed concern that this argument

10

11
12

13
14
15

16

17

18
19

“Evidence of HIV Treatment and Viral Suppression in Preventing the Sexual Transmission of HIV”
(December 2018), online: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention <cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/risk/art/cdchiv-art-viral-suppression.pdf>.
RSC 1985, c C-46.
See Public Prosecution Service of Canada, Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook (Ottawa:
Attorney General of Canada, 2018), part V, s 5.12 [“Prosecutions Involving Non-Disclosure of HIV
Status”]. See also Davinder Singh & Karen Busby, “Criminalizing HIV Non-Disclosure: Using Public
Health to Inform Criminal Law” (2019) 42:3 Man LJ 89.
See e.g. R v Kaotalok, 2013 NWTSC 36 [Kaotalok]; R v Ngeruka, 2015 YKTC 10 [Ngeruka].
“Prosecutions Involving Non-Disclosure of HIV Status,” supra note 12 at 2–3.
See Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund, “A Feminist Approach to Law Reform on HIV NonDisclosure,” online: <www.leaf.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/2019-01-08-LEAF-HIV-ND-PositionPaper-FINAL.pdf >.
See “The Criminalization of HIV Non-Disclosure in Canada: Current Status and the Need for Change”
at 8, online (pdf): Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network <aidslaw.ca/site/the-criminalization-of-hiv-nondisclosure-in-canada-report/?lang=en>.
See Colin Hastings, Cécile Kazatchkine & Eric Mykhalovskiy, “HIV Criminalization in Canada: Key
Trends and Patterns,” online (pdf): Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network <aidslaw.ca/site/hiv-criminali
zation-in-canada-key-trends-and-patterns/?lang=en>. See also Eric Mykhalovskiy & Glenn Betteridge,
“Who? What? Where? When? And with What Consequences? An Analysis of Criminal Cases of HIV
Non-Disclosure in Canada” (2012) 27:1 CJLS 31.
See e.g. R v Cuerrier (1996), 141 DLR (4th) 503 (BCCA); R v Ssenyonga, 1993 CanLII 14680 (Ont Sup
Ct) [Ssenyonga].
Ibid.
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did “violence”20 to the meaning of assault which was meant to control the non-consensual
application of force: “[w]hat the Crown is asking this court to control is the transmission of
HIV and the spread of AIDS rather than the application of force. In my opinion, the law of
assault is too blunt an instrument to be used to excise AIDS from the body politic.”21
There were a number of guilty pleas to criminal negligence causing bodily harm in the
early HIV nondisclosure cases,22 but criminal negligence-based offences could only be used
where the Crown could prove the accused transmitted the virus to the complainant. This is
because criminal negligence is only criminalized in Canada where actual bodily harm or
death is caused.23 There was immense pressure on the accused in these early cases, all of
whom were facing a highly stigmatizing, potentially fatal, disease. Such pressure,
exacerbated by sensationalist media coverage, may explain the high rate of guilty pleas.24
After almost a decade of uncertainty, in 1998 the Supreme Court of Canada in Cuerrier
decided that the nondisclosure of one’s HIV-positive status to a sexual partner could
constitute aggravated assault or aggravated sexual assault and these charges quickly became
the norm.25 Prior to Cuerrier, fraud vitiating consent had been limited to only two contexts:
deceptions related to the identity of the sexual partner (for example, someone who thought
she was having sex with her partner when really it was his identical twin)26 and those relating
to the nature and quality of the act (for example, someone who thought she was undergoing
a medical procedure when, in fact, it was sexual activity).27 It had long been established that
lying about an STI did not come within this understanding of fraud.28 In 1983, Parliament
enacted major reforms to sexual assault law, inspired by feminist activists, making a number
of important changes to the law such as replacing the crime of rape with three levels of
20
21
22

23
24

25

26
27

28

Ibid at 266.
Ibid at 265–66.
See e.g. R v Wentzell, [1989] NSJ No 510 (QL) (Co Ct) [Wentzell]; R v Mercer (1993), 110 Nfld & PEIR
41 (CA) [Mercer]. Mercer pleaded guilty to two counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm after
failing to disclose his HIV-positive status to two sexual partners, a 16-year-old girl with whom he was
in an ongoing relationship and a young mother who was visiting Newfoundland. Both women tested
positive for HIV and the 16-year-old girl became pregnant and had an abortion. The accused was
sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, but the Court of Appeal raised the sentence to 11 years,
describing the crimes as “of monumental proportions”: Mercer, ibid at para 85.
See Criminal Code, supra note 11, ss 220–21.
See e.g. “AIDS Man Held,” The Province (11 April 1989) 8. See also “AIDS Man Loses Jail Appeal”
The Province (14 September 1989) 33; “AIDS Man Sought Many Sex Partners Bail Hearing Told,” The
Toronto Star (11 April 1989) F7; “‘AIDS Man’ is Denied Bail,” The Windsor Star (13 April 1989) 11;
Dave Haynes, “AIDS Story Sparks Panic, Concern, Hatred,” Calgary Herald (13 April 1989) B1;
“Pregnant Woman Has AIDS, Bisexual Man Jailed 3 Years,” The Windsor Star (9 December 1989) A1;
“Bisexual Admits Spreading AIDS,” The Windsor Star (9 September 1989) A19; “‘Damn You!’ Woman
Cries ‘Trusting’ Man Accused of Infecting 3,” The Hamilton Spectator (7 April 1993) A3.
Supra note 1. The charge in Cuerrier was aggravated assault perhaps because those charges were laid
at a time when sexual assault charges had been largely rejected by courts. However, the reasoning in the
Cuerrier majority made it clear that aggravated sexual assault charges could also be substantiated. The
Supreme Court did not address the difference between these two crimes in this context and subsequent
cases relied primarily on the more serious aggravated sexual assault charge.
See R v GC, 2010 ONCA 451.
The pre-1983 Criminal Code provided that consent, for the purposes of rape, could not be obtained by
“personating [the complainant’s] husband” or by “false and fraudulent representations as to the nature
and quality of the act”: Criminal Code, RSC 1970, c C-34, s 143(b) (ii)–(iii). See also Bolduc and Bird
v The Queen, [1967] SCR 677, where the Supreme Court held that, where a doctor falsely passed off his
friend, who was observing the medical exam, as a medical intern, this was not fraud going to the nature
and quality of the act performed by the doctor; the majority explicitly differentiated the situation where
someone passes themselves off as a doctor and engages in a fraudulent medical exam. For a more
detailed description of this development of fraud, see Martha Shaffer, “Sex, Lies, and HIV: Mabior and
the Concept of Sexual Fraud” (2013) 63:3 UTLJ 466 at 467.
See The Queen v Clarence (1888), 22 QBD 23.
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sexual assault,29 eliminating the marital exemption which had existed for rape,30 removing
the corroboration requirement,31 and including protections regarding the introduction of
complainant sexual history evidence.32 Along with these amendments, the fraud provision
was modified such that the Criminal Code now simply stated that consent would be negated
by fraud, without any explicit limits thereon.33 The Supreme Court in Cuerrier thus had its
first opportunity to consider fraud in light of these reforms. However, undertaking this task
in the context of HIV nondisclosure shaped the contours of fraud in ways that would have
long-lasting implications.
C.

THE DECISION IN CUERRIER

In Cuerrier, the Supreme Court Justices were divided on the proper scope of fraud
vitiating consent. The majority, per Justice Cory, used the understanding of commercial fraud
to inform fraud in sexual assault cases; there had to be a deception and a corresponding
deprivation.34 The deception, failing to disclose one’s HIV status, could be satisfied by lying
about one’s HIV status or even by saying nothing.35 With respect to the deprivation, the
majority held that the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to
disclose one’s HIV status created a significant risk of serious bodily harm. Because the risk
in this case was the possible transmission of HIV, and that risk “endangered” the life of the
complainant, aggravated assault or aggravated sexual assault, both very serious crimes, could
be established.36 The majority took a broad approach to endangerment as an element of
aggravated (sexual) assault. While most people would agree that acquiring HIV met the
criterion of endangerment of life, the majority held that even the risk of acquiring HIV was
sufficient to endanger life regardless of whether that risk materialized.37 The majority also
required a causal connection between the deception and the deprivation; the Crown must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant would not have consented had the
accused properly disclosed his HIV-positive status.38
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé would have gone further in extending fraud to any deception that
was intended to, and did in fact, induce the complainant to consent.39 The Crown would be
required to prove that the complainant would not otherwise have agreed to the sexual activity
without the deceit and that the accused knew that fact. For example, if a man lied about his
marital status or his wealth to induce agreement to participate in sex, the Crown would have
to prove that the complainant would not have consented had she known the correct
information, and that the accused knew this fact, in order to establish fraud vitiating consent.

29

30
31
32

33
34
35
36
37
38
39

An Act to Amend the Criminal Code in relation to sexual offences and other offences against the person
and to amend certain other Acts in relation thereto or in consequence thereof, SC 1980-81-82, c 125,
s 246.1 [1982 Code Amendment].
Ibid, s 246.8.
Ibid, s 246.1(2).
Ibid, s 246.6. See also Margaret A Somerville & Gerald L Gall, “Sexual Assault” in The Canadian
Encyclopedia (Toronto: Historica Canada, 2020), online: <www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/
sexual-assault>.
See 1982 Code Amendment, supra note 29, s 244(3). See also R v Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19 at para 31
[Hutchinson].
Cuerrier, supra note 1 at para 116.
Ibid at para 126.
See Criminal Code, supra note 11, ss 268(1), 273(1).
Cuerrier, supra note 1 at para 137.
Ibid at para 130.
Ibid at para 16.
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Justice L’Heureux-Dubé understood that the decision was going to have broad implications
for sexual assault beyond the context of HIV nondisclosure and that basing fraud on the risk
of bodily harm would be unnecessarily limiting:
[F]raud is simply about whether the dishonest act in question induced another to consent to the ensuing
physical act, whether or not that act was particularly risky and dangerous. The focus of the inquiry into
whether fraud vitiated consent so as to make certain physical contact non-consensual should be on whether
the nature and execution of the deceit deprived the complainant of the ability to exercise his or her will in
relation to his or her physical integrity with respect to the activity in question.

40

Admittedly, the test put forward by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé is a broad one. Various forms
of deceptions, half-truths, and omissions are probably common in negotiating consent. But
she focused on whether the deception was intentional and whether the complainant was
denied the ability to exercise her autonomy. Justice McLachlin, as she was then, by contrast,
would have taken the narrowest approach, criminalizing only cases where there was a serious
risk of infecting the complainant, a position from which she would retreat in Mabior.
Some issues were left open in Cuerrier, such as whether using a condom would negate
a significant risk of bodily harm and how serious the risk had to be in order to be deemed
significant. Most of the justices in Cuerrier indicated that using a condom might be enough
to negate the significant risk but the issue was not resolved and the decision in Mabior would
later reject this position.41
D.

THE FALLOUT FROM CUERRIER

The case law after Cuerrier demonstrated that courts were struggling with how to
operationalize this new legal test. Cuerrier focused the issue on whether a risk was
significant, which in turn required identifying what that risk was in each case. Quantifying
the risk necessitated extensive expert testimony about the accused’s viral load, whether
condoms were consistently used, the particular sex act at issue, and other factors that
contributed to that risk. Experts could estimate the level of risk presented to the complainant,
but it was left to the trier of fact to determine whether a particular risk was significant enough
to warrant criminal liability. Cuerrier provided no guidelines for making this assessment.
The Crown would also have to prove that the complainant would not have had sex with the
accused had he or she known that the accused was HIV-positive. This opened up difficult
questions around the admissibility of evidence about the complainant’s sexual history, for
example, to demonstrate a pattern of engaging in unprotected sex42 or, where the complainant
40
41

42

Ibid.
See Mabior SCC, supra note 3 at para 99. The Court of Appeal of Manitoba in R v Mabior, 2010 MBCA
93 [Mabior MBCA] at para 87 held that careful use of a condom would suffice to negate a significant
risk of transmission.
See e.g. R v Boone, 2016 ONCA 227 at para 45 [Boone], where the Court of Appeal reviewed the
conflicting Ontario case law on both sides of the issue and concluded that evidence that a complainant
engaged in “risky” sex in the past should not have been admitted: “[a]llowing the defence to probe the
complainants’ prior sexual behaviour would discourage the reporting of sexual assaults and would
‘potential[ly cause] prejudice to the complainant’s personal dignity and right of privacy’: ss. 276(3)(b)
and (f).” In R v Clarke, 2013 ONSC 3232 [Clarke], the complainant’s prior sexual history with the
accused was admitted to show a willingness to continue to have sex with the accused after he disclosed
his HIV-positive status. See also R v Wilcox, 2014 SCC 75, aff’g 2014 QCCA 321 [Wilcox] where the
Supreme Court held that the fact that the complainant continued to have sex with the accused after
disclosure did not undermine the finding that the complainant would not have consented had he known
the accused was HIV positive.
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tested HIV-positive, to show that the complainant might have acquired the virus from
someone else.43
After the justices in Cuerrier hinted that condom use might reduce the risk below the level
of significance,44 some courts held that protected sex could not rise to the threshold of
a significant risk,45 while others found that a condom alone was insufficient to negate a
significant risk, thus creating inconsistent results on the condom issue as well.46 Not
surprisingly, reasonable judges and juries differed as to how much risk was necessary to
cross the threshold of significance, thus resulting in inconsistent decisions across the country
and a lack of certainty for people living with HIV. This uncertainty can be illustrated through
a British Columbia case decided in 2010.47 The accused, J.A.T., was HIV-positive and in an
intimate relationship with the complainant for ten months. The two men almost always used
condoms, but the trial judge found that there were three instances of unprotected anal sex.48
At trial, expert testimony quantified the risk of transmission to the complainant at 4 in 10,000
for each instance of unprotected anal intercourse with J.A.T.49 Justice Fenlon (as she then
was) found that there were three occasions of unprotected sex, making the total risk to the
complainant 12 in 10,000.50 The justice appears to have assumed in this case that the
incidents of protected sex did not constitute a significant enough risk to be added to the
calculation. The challenging question was whether that risk met the bar of “significance.”
Justice Fenlon concluded both that the risk was not significant and that the complainant’s life

43

44

45
46

47

48
49

50

In cases where the complainant tests positive for HIV and it cannot be proven that the accused was the
one who transmitted HIV, or in cases where it cannot be proven that the complainant acquired the virus
from the accused after the accused discovered their HIV-positive status, the appropriate verdict is
attempted aggravated sexual assault, a less serious crime than where the virus is not transmitted. See R
v Williams, 2003 SCC 41 [Williams]. See also R v Thomas, 2011 ONSC 7136 [Thomas]. However, see
R v Schenkels, 2017 MBCA 62 [Schenkels], where the Crown had not proven that it was the accused
who transmitted the virus to the complainant, but the Court nonetheless upheld the verdict of aggravated
sexual assault because any suggestion that the complainant acquired the virus elsewhere was purely
speculative.
See Cuerrier, supra note 1. Justice Cory is explicit in addressing condom use, stating at para 129: “[t]o
have intercourse with a person who is HIV-positive will always present risks. Absolutely safe sex may
be impossible. Yet the careful use of condoms might be found to so reduce the risk of harm that it could
no longer be considered significant so that there might not be either deprivation or risk of deprivation.”
Justice McLachlin, in her judgment at paras 73–74, stated that protected sex would not be caught by her
test.
See e.g. R v Agnatuk-Mercier, [2001] OJ No 4729 (QL) (Sup Ct) [Agnatuk-Mercier]; R v Nduwayo,
2012 BCCA 281 [Nduwayo].
See R v Mabior, 2008 MBQB 201 [Mabior MBQB]; R v NG, 2020 ONCA 494 [NG ONCA]; R v NG,
2017 ONSC 6739 [NG 2017]. In R v Mekonnen, 2009 ONCJ 643, for example, the accused was
convicted of aggravated sexual assault for having sex four times with the complainant. While he denied
the sexual activity, she reported it as involving the use of a condom on each occasion but could not
remember if a condom was used during one episode of fellatio. The trial judge convicted the accused
nonetheless. Years later, however, after the decision in Mabior, the convictions were overturned because
defence counsel had wrongly conceded that nondisclosure alone could substantiate aggravated sexual
assault: see R v Mekonnen, 2013 ONCA 414 at para 48 [Mekonnen].
See R v JAT, 2010 BCSC 766 at para 29 [JAT]. After the preliminary hearing, the accused had
(unsuccessfully) sought to quash the committal to stand trial on the basis that the Crown had failed to
present evidence of a significant risk of serious bodily harm to substantiate the aggravated sexual assault
charge. In dismissing the appeal from the trial judge’s refusal to quash the charges, the Court of Appeal
clarified that Cuerrier had not set any guidelines for determining what risk was significant. See R v JT,
2008 BCCA 463 [JT]. See also Mabior MBCA, supra note 41 at para 67.
See JAT, ibid at para 53.
This risk was based on a number of factors including the accused’s viral load, the fact that the
complainant was uncircumcised, and the fact that the accused was the receptive partner in their sexual
interactions and not the insertive partner, which would have increased the risk (ibid at para 29).
Ibid at para 56. This additive approach actually overstates the risk to the complainant; one cannot simply
add the risk from each sexual encounter together to get the combined risk of three independent acts of
unprotected sex.
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was not endangered: “a risk of transmission of HIV of 0.12% is not material enough to
establish deprivation invalidating the consent of the complainant.”51 Thus, the accused was
acquitted. This is in contrast with R. c. D.C.,52 where the trial judge convicted the accused
despite finding that the accused had an undetectable viral load and the risk of transmission
during the one instance of unprotected sex created a risk of transmission of 1 in 10,000, a risk
considerably lower than the risk at issue in JAT.53 While the Court of Appeal of Quebec went
on to overturn this finding, it nonetheless demonstrates the lack of certainty around the term
“significant risk.”54 It should also be noted that had JAT been decided after Mabior, Justice
Fenlon might well have been required to convict because no condom was used despite her
finding that the risk was not significant.
There were many other problems with the post-Cuerrier approach. For example, an expert
witness would not know how a condom was used by the parties nor whether the condom was
past its expiry date.55 Where the accused’s viral load was being monitored, expert witnesses
had to extrapolate from the most recent test. This was even more difficult for cases based on
multiple instances of sexual activity over an extended period of time where the expert had
to extrapolate about the risk of transmission at multiple different points in time. These
prosecutions became complex, expensive, and rife with potential for inconsistency. It is
therefore understandable why the Supreme Court granted leave in Mabior and R. v. D.C.56
with a view to clarifying some of the issues left uncertain in Cuerrier.
E.

DOUBLING DOWN IN MABIOR AND DC

Mabior and DC presented two very different pictures of HIV nondisclosure: on the one
hand, an HIV-positive man who was sexually exploiting teenage girls, several of whom were
Indigenous girls grappling with substance abuse and, on the other, a woman whose abusive
partner, four years after the fact, raised one incident of nondisclosure that had taken place at
the beginning of their long-term relationship. In Mabior, the accused had sex with nine
female complainants in exchange for drugs or for a place to stay. Three of the complainants
testified that they did not consent to sex.57 The evidence indicated that the accused used
condoms on some of these occasions but not on others, and that some of the condoms had
not been used properly because he had twice been infected with gonorrhea and was listed as
a contact for chlamydia.58 He also went on antiretrovirals months after learning of his
diagnosis. None of the complainants tested positive for HIV. The accused was convicted of
six counts of aggravated sexual assault at trial, sentenced to 14 years of incarceration, and
later deported.59 The trial judge held that, even where Mabior used a condom, the risk of
transmission was nonetheless significant. Only if the accused used a condom and had an
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undetectable viral load would the threshold of significance not have been met. The Court of
Appeal of Manitoba overturned this decision and held that either the careful use of a condom
or an undetectable viral load could negate the significance of the risk.60
In DC, the accused met the complainant at their respective children’s soccer game and
eventually entered into a four-year relationship with him. The relationship ended violently
with the complainant seriously assaulting D.C. It was only after his conviction for that
assault that he went to the police to complain about one incident of apparently unprotected
sex prior to D.C. having disclosed her status to him. The virus was not transmitted to the
complainant. While D.C. claimed that a condom was used on that one occasion, the
complainant denied that assertion. D.C.’s doctor testified that D.C. had told her they used a
condom but that it had broken during intercourse, a fact which the trial judge used to infer
that D.C. must have been lying to her doctor and to the Court. The evidence at trial was that
the risk of D.C. transmitting the virus to the complainant on that occasion, even without a
condom, was 1 in 10,000 because she had an undetectable viral load at the time of the
incident of sexual intercourse. The trial judge nonetheless found D.C. guilty of aggravated
assault and sexual assault.61 This decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal, following
the Court of Appeal of Manitoba decision in Mabior, on the basis that an undetectable viral
load made the risk of bodily harm not significant.
Both the Court of Appeal of Manitoba in Mabior62 and the Court of Appeal of Quebec in
D.C. c. R.63 had urged the Supreme Court of Canada to clarify its position around significant
risk, specifically as it related to condom use and viral load.64 Perhaps most importantly, our
understanding of HIV and our ability to treat it had grown exponentially between the time
Cuerrier entered the legal system and the time when Mabior and DC were decided.65 Being
HIV-positive was no longer considered a death sentence and persons with HIV who were
receiving treatment were living much longer and healthier lives. In addition to extending the
lives of people with HIV, HAART had been shown to significantly decrease the risk of
transmission. In other words, treatment and prevention had merged.66
It is clear from the Mabior judgment that the Supreme Court recognized the mess Cuerrier
had left in its wake. The Supreme Court in Mabior described what would happen if it were
to accept a case-by-case application of Cuerrier moving forward:
In every case, medical experts would have to be called. Lengthy examination and cross-examination would
have to take place. Trial judges would have to spend long hours assessing the evidence to determine if it
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establishes a “significant risk of serious bodily harm” at the time of the alleged offence. Finally, the risk of
conflicting judgments could render the process unfair from a systemic standpoint. The court of appeal, while
accepting the trial judge’s conclusions on the evidence, might take a different view on the mixed question
of fact and law of whether the risk was “significant”. Years may pass in legal no-man’s-land with no one
knowing whether the accused is guilty or not guilty. Enormous costs, both for the prosecution and the
defence, would be run up.

67

As I have observed elsewhere, the language of the Supreme Court reveals that the justices
believed they were taking a balanced approach that recognized the need for restraint when
it came to prosecuting these cases.68 The Supreme Court stressed that its decision was meant
to “[strike] an appropriate balance between the complainant’s interest in autonomy and
equality and the need to prevent over-extension of criminal sanctions.”69
It was clear that the Supreme Court wanted to establish some ground rules around the
standard of significant risk in order to put an end to the “legal no-man’s-land”70 that it had
created just over a decade earlier. Yet, instead of following the Court of Appeal of Manitoba,
the coalition of HIV/AIDS groups that intervened, and the medical evidence at trial, the
Supreme Court doubled down in its support for Cuerrier and added that, in the context of
HIV nondisclosure, a significant risk of transmission would be established if there was a
realistic possibility of transmission.71 The language of “possibility,” for some, suggested an
even harsher test than the significant risk test from Cuerrier.72 However, the more
problematic aspect of Mabior was its operationalization of the realistic possibility of
transmission. In order to negate a realistic possibility of transmission, an accused would have
to have used a condom and had a low viral load at the time of the sexual activity in question.
One of these factors alone would not suffice. The Supreme Court rejected the position of the
Court of Appeal because, even with a condom, “the risk might still fall above the ‘negligible’
threshold.”73 With respect to viral load, the evidence in Mabior was that the risk of
transmission “is reduced by 89 to 96% when the HIV-positive partner is treated with
antiretrovirals, irrespective of whether the viral load is low or undetectable.”74 The expert at
trial testified that there was “a very high probability that the accused was not infectious, i.e.
could not have transmitted HIV”75 when his viral load was undetectable. Nonetheless, Chief
Justice McLachlin held that antiretroviral therapy alone “still exposes a sexual partner to a
realistic possibility of transmission.”76 The Supreme Court believed that focusing on a low
viral load, rather than an undetectable one, would reduce problems around proof given the
fluctuating nature of viral load.77 However, while some guidance was provided on what a low
viral load was, nothing was mentioned about how proximate to the time of the sexual activity
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the assessed viral load had to be measured.78 The Supreme Court went on to hold that the
combined effect of condom use and low viral load would reduce the risk to a “speculative
possibility rather than a realistic possibility.”79
So, what can we conclude from this decision? A realistic possibility appears to mean a risk
that is not negligible and not speculative. But any risk greater than negligible appears to be
sufficient for criminal liability. The Chief Justice ended her analysis with this important
caution:
However, the general proposition that a low viral load combined with condom use negates a realistic
possibility of transmission of HIV does not preclude the common law from adapting to future advances in
80

treatment and to circumstances where risk factors other than those considered in the present case are at play.

This passage is important but ambiguous and leads to two different possible interpretations
of Mabior. The first interpretation of Mabior and DC is that the Supreme Court is setting
down a rigid rule that the only way to negate a realistic possibility of transmission of HIV
is to demonstrate both a low viral load and the use of a condom. This flows from the
Supreme Court’s explicit concern that it was trying to set down clear rules that would remove
the necessity of a trier of fact assessing the significance of the accused’s risk in every case.
A second, more flexible, interpretation based on this passage is that the Supreme Court was
open to the evolving science of HIV and was not setting a requirement that both a condom
be used and low viral load be established. Rather, that standard could evolve as treatment
options and our understanding of risk developed.
There is considerable support in the judgment for the first interpretation. The Supreme
Court had the necessary science before it to conclude that an undetectable viral load or the
use of a condom could negate significant risk. A risk of 1 in 10,000, as was found at trial in
DC, even though an overstatement of D.C.’s risk, is a negligible risk. Instead, however, the
Supreme Court developed a test that requires virtually no risk of transmission.81 The Supreme
Court spoke about the law evolving in cases where “other risk factors” were at play,
presumably meaning factors other than condom use and viral load. The Supreme Court put
a tactical burden on future accused “to raise a reasonable doubt, by calling evidence that
[they] had a low viral load at the time and that condom protection was used.”82 The Supreme
Court’s decision in the companion case in DC also supports this interpretation. Instead of
concluding that a 1 in 10,000 risk was simply too speculative a basis for criminal liability,
the Supreme Court held that “[o]n the facts of this case, condom use was required to preclude
a realistic possibility of HIV transmission.”83 The Supreme Court then went out of its way
to overturn findings of fact by the trial judge in order to reach the conclusion that the absence
of condom use had not been clearly established. Otherwise, the Supreme Court’s own
reasoning in Mabior would have required a conviction for D.C.

78

79
80
81
82
83

See Shaffer, supra note 27 at 473. Shaffer also points out that the Supreme Court was vague about how
this new test applies to oral sex, where the risk of HIV transmission is much lower than for vaginal or
anal intercourse.
Mabior SCC, supra note 3 at para 101.
Ibid at para 104.
See Grant, supra note 68.
Mabior SCC, supra note 3 at para 105. This tactical burden is not insignificant.
DC, supra note 56 at para 2.

THE COMPLEX LEGACY OF R. V. CUERRIER

57

Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, the second interpretation has re-emerged in some
later cases as a plausible way to limit the vast scope of criminalization created by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Mabior. While the science was adequate to reach this
conclusion in Mabior, there is now more certainty that someone with an undetectable viral
load cannot transmit the virus.84 The Mabior approach thus makes even less sense now than
it did at the time the case was decided.
F.

THE FALLOUT FROM MABIOR

Soon after Mabior, in R. v. Felix, the accused did try to argue precisely that Mabior was
limited to the evidence about risk in the case before it and that it was not meant to set down
a rigid rule requiring condom use and a low viral load, independent of risk.85 The Court of
Appeal for Ontario rejected this argument, indicating that the Crown was not required to
prove the accused’s viral load in a case where no condom had been used. Because the sex
was unprotected, the accused’s viral load at the time was described by the Court of Appeal
as “simply irrelevant,”86 reinforcing that Mabior was setting down a rule that persons with
HIV could be convicted of aggravated sexual assault for HIV nondisclosure for unprotected
intercourse regardless of viral load. The fact that the risk of transmission was virtually nonexistent did not matter:
Mabior does not suggest that expert evidence of the basic risk of HIV transmission for intercourse will be
required in every case to ground a conviction for aggravated sexual assault arising from unprotected acts of
intercourse — anal or vaginal — with an HIV-positive partner. Rather, Mabior holds that a realistic
possibility of transmission of HIV is negated by evidence that condom protection was used and the accused’s
87

viral load was low at the time of intercourse.

According to this interpretation, the Crown can prove a realistic possibility of transmission
simply by proving unprotected intercourse.88
Similarly, we saw accused persons convicted despite the fact that they had an undetectable
viral load at the time of the sexual activity. In R. v. Murphy,89 the female accused had an
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undetectable viral load.90 One of the counts related to a male complainant with whom she had
engaged in cunnilingus. The sexual activity was limited to oral sex apparently because the
complainant believed that it was “highly unlikely that he could get sexually transmitted
diseases (STDs) from this activity.”91 In other words, the complainant had calculated the
risks involved and limited his sexual activity accordingly. At trial, the expert testified that
the risk of transmitting HIV from oral sex could not be defined in the expert studies but that
it would appear to be “much less likely than 1 chance in 25,000” and later at somewhere
between 1 in 50,000 and 1 in 100,000.92 When asked what was the risk of transmission from
intercourse from a female to male when the female in question had an undetectable viral
load, the expert testified that the risk was somewhere between 1 in 10,000 and 1 in 25,000,
but that some studies indicated the risk was zero.93
The trial judge acquitted on the count of aggravated sexual assault related to cunnilingus
holding that the Crown had failed to prove a realistic possibility of transmission, but
convicted the accused of aggravated sexual assault for the one sexual encounter with another
complainant where the evidence showed that no condom was used during vaginal
intercourse: “I am satisfied that although her viral count was low, indeed undetectable under
the current science testing regime, there existed a realistic possibility of transmission of HIV
when sexual intercourse occurs.”94 These cases represent the high point of
overcriminalization of persons with HIV and show the dangers of the first, more rigid,
interpretation of Mabior described above.
Some judges have resisted the expansive approach to criminalization from Mabior.
Perhaps most notable were two decisions out of the Youth Court in Nova Scotia. These
prosecutions involved the same person, a male who was 16 at the time of the conduct leading
to charges of aggravated sexual assault. What was unusual about these cases was that the
HIV-positive accused appeared to be what is known as an “elite controller,” described as
“one of a small number of people whose immune systems control the virus, seemingly
indefinitely.”95 The virus had not been detectable in his system since he was five years old,96
although he was also intermittently on antiretrovirals. After his mother died of AIDS, J.T.C.
ended up in the child welfare system being shuffled between various family members, foster
parents, and group homes.97 The expert testimony at both of his trials suggested that the
accused had an undetectable viral load and “had no realistic possibility of transmitting the
virus to anyone.”98 J.T.C.’s first trial99 involved a charge of aggravated sexual assault for one
episode of sexual intercourse with an underage girl, who Judge Derrick described as being
at best “pretty sure” a condom was not used.100 The accused was acquitted on the basis that
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the judge had a reasonable doubt on the condom issue but she nonetheless went on to discuss
her “discomfort” with the Mabior decision.101 She began with some thinly veiled criticism
of the finding that an undetectable viral load could create a realistic possibility of
transmission:
It is difficult to understand how the Supreme Court of Canada determined that a non-detectable viral load
could constitute “a realistic possibility of transmission”. If the use of a condom in the case of a low viral load
reduces the risk of transmission to a “speculative possibility rather than a realistic possibility”, it is unclear
to me at least how a viral load that is undetectable rates a risk assessment greater than speculation.

102

She then observed that, while the Mabior decision explicitly rejected an absolute disclosure
standard, the Court’s finding on viral load was in direct conflict with that rejection.103 She
also called out the Supreme Court for purporting to show restraint while, in fact, expanding
criminalization.104 Judge Derrick did convict the accused of sexual interference because the
complainant was under the age of consent and the accused had failed to take all reasonable
steps to ascertain her age.
The second trial for J.T.C., before Judge Campbell, involved a charge of aggravated
sexual assault in relation to a 17-year-old complainant whom he had met in the child welfare
system.105 He used a condom in all three of their sexual encounters but, on the final occasion,
they took a break from sexual activity and when they resumed no condom was used because
it had broken.106 The same expert testified that there was no possibility of this accused
transmitting HIV to the complainant.107 He testified that public health officials consistently
recommend condoms, but that in a case where the risk is so close to zero, a condom provides
little additional protection against transmission. This case was unusual in that the
complainant testified that while she would not have consented to unprotected sex had she
known J.T.C. was HIV-positive, she would have consented had she known how small the
risk was at that time. It was on this basis that Judge Campbell acquitted the accused. To
convict him in light of this testimony “would amount to a strange privileging of half-truth,
deception and misconception over truth.”108
Judge Campbell could have stopped there, but instead he went on agree with Judge
Derrick and her concerns about overcriminalization. Where the risk of transmission is
effectively zero, a person with HIV is no different than anyone else in the population:
He or she becomes subject to the sanctions of the criminal law for engaging in a deception that is in reality
no more dangerous than the kinds of deceptions that the law has not criminalized. A segment of the
population that has been marginalized and discriminated against since the early 1980’s would be treated more
109

harshly by operation of law and not based on scientific evidence about the risk posed by the individual.
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Judge Campbell took the alternate interpretation of Mabior and DC presented above: that
these cases were only decided on the evidence before them and were not meant to set down
rules about what would constitute a realistic possibility of transmission. While Mabior had
found that a condom and a low viral load would negate a realistic possibility, the Supreme
Court had not explicitly stated that that was the only way the risk could be negated:
[The Court] does not state that an expert opinion which establishes that the risk of transmission in a particular
case is effectively zero is irrelevant. That would be tantamount to saying that the facts just don’t matter and
110

that a person with HIV is presumed to be infectious despite the facts.

Judge Campbell went on to conclude that the Supreme Court of Canada did not make factual
findings that were binding on trial courts which would contradict “clear, compelling and
precise evidence from an expert.”111 As he noted, “[i]f a zero risk, or an infinitesimally small
risk doesn’t qualify as speculative, it’s hard to imagine what would.”112 It is difficult to
understand why the Nova Scotia Crown felt incarceration was appropriate for this young
person, who was detained in custody throughout his trial.113
A third Nova Scotia decision in R. v. Thompson also made findings of fact directly
contrary to the apparent rule in Mabior in order to acquit an accused with a low viral load
of aggravated sexual assault.114 Relying on expert testimony from, among others, the same
physician whose evidence formed the basis of the decision in Mabior,115 the justice held that
“[i]f viral load is less than 1500, the risk of transmission is ‘negligible’ …, ‘extremely
unlikely’” and thus there was no realistic possibility of transmission.116 She went on to hold
that, had the accused used a condom117 or if he did not ejaculate, there would be no realistic
possibility of transmission.118 In a somewhat surprising twist, however, Justice Hood went
on to find the accused guilty of sexual assault causing bodily harm on the basis that he lied
about his HIV status (deception) and it caused bodily harm because the complainants
suffered significant psychological stress over whether they had acquired the virus
(deprivation). Thus, while limiting the decision in Mabior through her findings on viral load
and condom use, Justice Hood expanded the scope of criminalization considerably by
allowing the “significant risk of serious bodily harm” to be satisfied by the stress and
psychological harm caused to the complainants by the contemplation that they may have
acquired HIV. Through this logic, failure to disclose would always constitute sexual assault
causing bodily harm (unless the complainant was already HIV-positive), creating an absolute
requirement to disclose in every case, a result even Mabior had cautioned against. The Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal overturned this finding, concluding that “[t]he sole test to establish
deprivation is actual transmission of HIV or ‘a realistic possibility of HIV transmission.’”119
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The Court held that the Mabior decision had clearly attempted to avoid the overbreadth and
stigmatization resulting from the use of criminal law against persons with HIV.120 The Crown
did not appeal the acquittals on the aggravated sexual assault charges and thus the Court of
Appeal did not discuss the trial judge’s findings regarding the risk of transmission.
The tactical evidentiary burden placed on the accused in Mabior has led some courts to
conclude that once the Crown has proven nondisclosure and that the complainant would not
have agreed to sexual activity had they known the accused’s status, it is then up to the
accused to raise a reasonable doubt about the level of risk the complainant faced, meaning
that the Crown need not prove that a condom was not used nor that an accused did not have
an undetectable viral load unless the accused has raised evidence to put those questions into
issue. In Schenkels, the accused, an Indigenous woman, failed to disclose her HIV-positive
status to the complainant, after which he tested positive for HIV.121 There was no evidence
regarding how the complainant contracted HIV. The Court of Appeal, relying on the
evidentiary burden placed on the accused in Mabior, did not require the Crown to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant acquired the virus from the accused.122
Mabior may not have removed the need for expert testimony, but it shifted the tactical
evidentiary burden of providing such testimony from the Crown to the accused.
As demonstrated by these cases, Ontario and Nova Scotia prosecutors in particular have
taken a very harsh approach to laying charges after Mabior, including where the accused had
an undetectable viral load123 and where the accused used a condom.124 In W.H., not only did
the accused have an undetectable viral load at the time of the one incident of alleged
nondisclosure, but the trial judge also made a finding of fact that the accused always used
condoms.125
However, we are also seeing some Ontario courts begin to resist Crown charges in cases
where the accused had a low viral load by taking the second, more flexible, interpretation of
Mabior that the case did not set down a rigid rule requiring both condom use and a low viral
load. In R. v. C.B., the Ontario Crown charged the accused with three counts of aggravated
sexual assault relating to three women, none of whom acquired the virus.126 The judge, in
acquitting the accused, held that the accused’s viral load was undetectable and the risk of
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asking the jury, and now this Court, to speculate. She is asking this Court to focus on
hypothetical alternative theories that have no basis in the evidence. There was no evidence
with respect to ways in which the complainant may have contracted HIV, other than from his
sexual activity with the accused, such as through any other sexual partners, blood transfusions
or intravenous drug use…. Simply put, there was no foundation in the evidence for these
theories. As such, they are hypothetical.
See e.g. R v WH, 2015 ONSC 6121 [WH]; JTC (Derrick), supra note 95; JTC (Campbell), supra note
105.
In NG 2017, supra note 46 at para 15, one complainant testified that a condom was used in all cases of
vaginal intercourse, but the accused was convicted nonetheless. The Court of Appeal confirmed that
consistent condom use was not enough to negate the realistic possibility of transmission. See NG ONCA,
supra note 46. In Thompson NSSC, supra note 114, the first complainant testified that the accused had
used a condom. In the latter decision, Thompson NSCA, supra note 119, the accused was acquitted.
Supra note 123 at para 43. The accused had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and stressed that he
believed he needed to use a condom for his own protection as well as that of his sexual partners.
2017 ONCJ 545 [CB].
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transmission “was as close to zero as can be measured.”127 Most recently, the Court of
Appeal for Ontario has signalled its willingness to reconsider the Mabior finding that a low
viral load is insufficient to negate a realistic possibility of transmission. In NG, the Court
acknowledged that the evolving science on viral load, in an appropriate case, could justify
reconsideration of the Supreme Court of Canada’s holding in Mabior.128
Ontario courts have been less willing to depart from Mabior in the context of condoms.
In NG, the trial judge refused to hold that condom use could negate liability. While the
science with respect to viral load may have evolved since the decision in Mabior, the same
was not true for condom use.129 The Court of Appeal for Ontario also declined to reconsider
the Mabior conclusion that using a condom is not sufficient to negate a realistic possibility
of transmission.130 The Court indicated that it would be appropriate to reconsider Mabior if
the factual underpinnings of that decision had changed. Unlike with our understanding of
viral load, which has evolved since Mabior, the Court held that the factual underpinnings of
the Mabior decision on condoms have not changed since Mabior. While a properly
functioning latex condom may reduce the risk of transmission by almost 100 percent, this
statistic does not acknowledge the possibility of human error and condom error.131 Thus, the
Court of Appeal for Ontario explicitly rejected the possibility that careful condom use was
sufficient to negate a realistic possibility of transmission. Recent cases in other provinces
tend to be limited to cases where the accused did transmit the virus to at least one
complainant.132
I am not suggesting that the criminalization of HIV nondisclosure is never appropriate.
Where a person who is HIV-positive with an uncontrolled viral load fails to use a condom,
the law has a place in prosecuting these cases, particularly where the virus has been
transmitted to the complainant. While proving the accused was the person who actually
transmitted the virus to the complainant can raise its own evidentiary concerns, limiting
prosecutions in this way would greatly reduce the number of cases moving forward. In
reviewing 72 reported cases of HIV nondisclosure, I found that only approximately onequarter of all complainants actually tested positive for HIV by the time of trial.133 This rate
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Ibid at para 91. Justice Gee went on to acquit the accused of sexual assault causing bodily harm with
respect to the one complainant who acquired the herpes complex virus at some point after having sex
with the accused. While he found the circumstances to be “suspicious and troubling,” he was not
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the source of the complainant’s infection. Nor
was he convinced that the complainant would have withheld consent to sex on this basis. See ibid at
paras 99–100.
NG ONCA, supra note 46 at paras 78–81.
See NG 2017, supra note 46 at para 88.
See NG ONCA, supra note 46.
See ibid at paras 99–100. It is true that one of the complainants in NG tested positive for HIV, but it is
important to note that the Crown did not allege that the complainant acquired the virus from the accused
nor did the trial judge make such a finding. See NG 2017, supra note 46 at para 98.
See R v Nyoni, 2017 BCCA 360 [Nyoni]; R v KG, 2016 ABCA 205 [KG]; R v Gauthier, 2020 BCSC 146
[Gauthier]; Schenkels, supra note 43. See also R c Tshibamba Muntu, 2017 QCCQ 4299 [Tshibamba
Muntu] (where the accused was charged with failure to disclose with respect to nine victims, three of
whom acquired HIV). In contrast, R c FC, 2017 QCCQ 4348 (where neither complainant acquired the
virus).
The cases reviewed include: Cuerrier, supra note 1; Mabior SCC, supra note 3; Summer, supra note
8; Ngeruka, supra note 13; Kaotalok, supra note 13; Ssenyonga, supra note 18; Wentzell, supra note 22;
Mercer, supra note 22; Boone, supra note 42; Clarke, supra note 42; Wilcox, supra note 42; Williams,
supra note 43; Schenkels, supra note 43; Thomas, supra note 43; Agnatuk-Mercier, supra note 45;
Nduwayo, supra note 45; Mekonnen, supra note 46; JT, supra note 47; DC, supra note 56; Felix, supra
note 85; Murphy, supra note 89; JTC (Derrick), supra note 95; JTC (Campbell), supra note 105;
Thompson NSCA, supra note 119; WH, supra note 123; CB, supra note 126; Nyoni, ibid; Gauthier, ibid;
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went up to 44 percent when looked at from the perspective of each individual accused. In
other words, fewer than half of all accused transmitted the virus to any complainant. These
numbers would be even lower if one removed the pre-Cuerrier case law where rates of
transmission were higher because of the unavailability of treatment options. Thus, even this
change to the law would reduce the number of prosecutions considerably. As will be
discussed below, there are other crimes in the Criminal Code, such as criminal negligence
causing bodily harm, that could be used where necessary.
Cuerrier and its progeny have a left a legacy beyond criminalization for people with HIV.
These cases have also had a considerable impact on the law of sexual assault generally. It is
to this part of Cuerrier’s legacy that I now turn.
III. CUERRIER’S LEGACY FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT
A.

THE DECISION IN HUTCHINSON

We have seen in the previous section how some courts have started to resist the Supreme
Court of Canada’s overcriminalization of HIV nondisclosure by limiting prosecutions beyond
the Supreme Court’s direction in Mabior. The HIV nondisclosure cases have had
implications for the law of sexual assault in two ways. First, the contours of sexual fraud
have evolved almost exclusively in the context of the risk of disease transmission. Second,
because of concerns about the possibility of prosecuting HIV nondisclosure without resorting
to fraud, the interpretation of consent in the Criminal Code has been limited in incoherent
ways. In order to understand these two aspects of Cuerrier’s legacy, it is necessary to
examine in some detail the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Hutchinson.134
Hutchinson is an interesting case because, while it has nothing to do with HIV/AIDS, the
decision was driven by concerns around not expanding the scope of prosecution for HIV
nondisclosure. It is notable that no feminist groups intervened in Hutchinson, while the
Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network (now HIV Legal Network) and the HIV and AIDS
Legal Clinic Ontario intervened in coalition. As a result, the Supreme Court heard about the
implications of the decision for HIV nondisclosure but did not hear about the implications
of its decision for sexual assault more generally.
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The accused in Hutchinson was in an intimate relationship with the complainant which
lasted for about nine months. They used condoms for birth control and only had sex without
a condom when the complainant was menstruating. When the complainant began to express
concerns about the future of their relationship, the accused decided that impregnating the
complainant, contrary to her wishes, would be the best way to ensure the couple stayed
together. He thus cut holes in the condoms that the couple used to prevent conception. The
complainant became pregnant and, while they initially stayed together, her concerns about
the relationship led her to leave the accused and to have an abortion. After the abortion, she
developed an infection which included extreme bleeding and severe pain for about two
weeks. After the breakup, Hutchinson told her that he had sabotaged the condoms. When the
complainant inspected the remaining condoms, she discovered that each one had a hole
pierced through it. She contacted the police and Hutchinson was charged with aggravated
sexual assault.
What does a case about an abusive partner who sabotages condoms have to do with
prosecuting HIV nondisclosure? To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the
legislative definition of consent in the Criminal Code. Section 273.1(1) of the Criminal Code
defines consent as “the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual
activity in question.”135 Some examples are listed of ways consent is not given but nonconsent is not explicitly defined in the Criminal Code. In Hutchinson, the complainant
clearly agreed to some form of sexual intercourse with Hutchinson. Did she, however,
consent to sexual intercourse with a sabotaged condom or, effectively, no condom? The
answer to this question boils down to the meaning of “the sexual activity in question” in the
definition of consent. Does it mean simply consenting to vaginal intercourse? Or does it
mean consenting to vaginal intercourse only where a condom is used?
There were two possible routes to liability for Hutchinson. First, if the damage to the
condoms changed the nature of “the sexual activity in question” in the definition of consent,
then Hutchinson could be convicted of some form of sexual assault because the complainant
did not consent to sex without a condom. The second route to conviction would be to argue,
analogous to the HIV nondisclosure context, that any consent to engage in sexual activity on
the part of the complainant was vitiated by fraud along the lines we have seen in Cuerrier
and Mabior. In this latter scenario, Hutchinson’s deception about the condoms would vitiate
consent to sexual activity only if there was a significant risk of serious bodily harm to the
complainant.
For many, sex with a condom is a very different activity than sex without such protection.
The obvious reasons relate to transmission of STI’s and risk of pregnancy but there may also
be a level of intimacy involved in sex without a condom that some may choose not to
experience. Including condom use within the scope of consent would give the complainant
the ability to determine not only the nature of the sexual activity but also how that activity
is carried out. The fraud option, by contrast, has a significant limitation. Fraud only negates
consent where there is a significant risk of bodily harm. The Supreme Court of Canada
imposed this requirement to limit the scope of HIV nondisclosure prosecutions. The
complainant in Hutchinson did experience bodily harm. As a result of the accused’s actions,
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she became pregnant, had an abortion, and experienced complications.136 If we change the
facts and imagine a hypothetical complainant who has no risk of unwanted pregnancy,
perhaps because of age, infertility, or because she was already pregnant, reliance on the fraud
option would lead to the conclusion that sabotaging a condom would not constitute sexual
assault unless the accused had an STI because there would be no significant risk of serious
bodily harm. The doctrine of fraud vitiating consent does not acknowledge a woman’s right
to choose what STI risk and what level of intimacy around sexual intercourse she is willing
to experience. Similarly, for gay men, criminal law would only protect the right to insist on
a condom where one partner has an STI. A man would have no right to decide not to expose
himself to that possibility. So those concerned about the law providing broad autonomy to
complainants about when and how to engage in sexual activity would probably prefer the
first option — that sexual intercourse with a condom is a different “sexual activity in
question” than sexual activity without a condom and requires agreement to participate in that
specific sexual activity.
That being said, there was also a concern about the scope of the first route to liability. If
“the sexual activity in question” includes factors other than simply agreeing to engage in a
particular sex act, HIV nondisclosure could potentially be prosecuted as sexual assault
without any requirement of proving deception or the required risk of bodily harm which
limits fraud. Instead, this argument goes, consent could be negated simply by showing that
a complainant did not consent to sex with someone who was HIV-positive (just like she did
not consent to sex without a condom), without requiring the Crown to prove the significant
risk of bodily harm. Hypothetically, then, HIV nondisclosure cases could be prosecuted even
where the accused used a condom and had a low viral load, circumventing the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on HIV nondisclosure as fraud. This is precisely why the HIV/AIDS
coalition intervened in Hutchinson at the Supreme Court and argued that incorporating
dishonesty into the “sexual activity in question” would render the doctrine of fraud
meaningless and risk the overcriminalization of persons with HIV. Thus, the Supreme Court
was faced with a choice: risk expanding the scope of criminalization of HIV nondisclosure
prosecutions even further or take a narrow approach to consent to avoid this possibility.
The Supreme Court of Canada was unanimous that Hutchinson was guilty of sexual
assault but it was divided as to the means of arriving at that conclusion.137 A four-justice
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Because the complainant’s life was not endangered, the aggravated sexual assault charge was not
substantiated. See Hutchinson, supra note 33 at para 74.
See Hutchinson, supra note 33. If these facts were to arise again, it appears that the appropriate charge
would be sexual assault causing bodily harm assuming the accused is not HIV-positive. The uncertainty
surrounding this case was demonstrated by the difficulty lower court judges had in deciding how to deal
with Hutchinson’s conduct. At his first trial, in R v Hutchinson, 2009 NSSC 51, the justice directed a
verdict of acquittal before Hutchinson even presented a defence because all the parties agreed that the
complainant had consented to engage in sexual intercourse with him and therefore there was no sexual
assault. In R v Hutchinson, 2010 NSCA 3, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal was divided both on the
outcome and on how to get there, but a two to one majority agreed that the case should go back for a
new trial. On the retrial, in R v Hutchinson, 2011 NSSC 361, Justice Coughlan convicted Hutchinson
of sexual assault, holding that there was no voluntary agreement to engage in sexual intercourse without
contraception. While he found that the complainant’s life was not endangered, sexual assault causing
bodily harm was not considered. He sentenced the accused to 18 months’ imprisonment and to
registration as a sex offender for 20 years. The accused again appealed to the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal, which took the unusual step of sitting five judges on the appeal, demonstrating the importance
of the case: R v Hutchinson, 2013 NSCA 1. There, the majority held that the use of a condom is an
essential feature of the sex act and that there could be no consent to “the sexual activity in question” if
the complainant did not agree to unprotected sex. The use of a condom was an “inseparable component”
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majority, per Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Cromwell,138 held that Hutchinson’s
deception would only be criminal if the Crown could prove fraud vitiating consent. In other
words, whether a condom was used was not part of the sexual activity in question. The threejustice minority would have convicted Hutchinson on the basis that there was no voluntary
agreement to engage in the sexual activity in question (that is, sex without a condom) and
therefore there was no need to undertake an analysis of fraud.
The majority’s judgment appears to be motivated in large part by the need to carve out
distinct roles for the consent inquiry and for the fraud inquiry, ensuring that most of the work
around deceptions would be done under the concept of fraud, thus limiting the scope of
consent. The majority could see no reason why the facts in Hutchinson warranted a different
approach than the facts in Cuerrier: “[c]onsistency and certainty in the law require that both
situations be treated the same.”139 If deceptions could be addressed under “the sexual activity
in question,” the fraud inquiry would be redundant and there would be no need for a separate
fraud provision in the Criminal Code. Therefore, the majority decided that a narrow
definition of “voluntary agreement to the sexual activity in question” was required and that
the condom deception involved in this case had to be prosecuted through fraud, which would
involve a two-step test inquiry.
The first step is to determine whether consent to the sexual activity in question has been
given. This is a very limited inquiry; it “requires proof that the complainant did not
voluntarily agree to the touching, its sexual nature, or the identity of the partner.”140 But how
the sexual act is performed or the circumstances around performing it, are not part of the
consent inquiry. Thus, whether or not birth control is being used or whether the accused has
an STI, are not relevant considerations at this stage. If the Crown is able to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that one of these three components is not met, a finding of nonconsent will
be made and the accused will be convicted without the need to go on and consider fraud. If
the three components of consent are present, the analysis moves to the second step to
consider whether there are circumstances, such as fraud, which vitiate what would otherwise
have been a valid consent.
By treating Hutchinson’s deception as fraud, it was necessary for the Crown to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a significant risk of serious bodily harm to the
complainant. The majority did this by expanding the notion of risk to include the risk of
unwanted pregnancy as a risk of bodily harm:
The concept of “harm” does not encompass only bodily harm in the traditional sense of that term; it includes
at least the sorts of profound changes in a woman’s body — changes that may be welcomed or changes that
a woman may choose not to accept — resulting from pregnancy. Depriving a woman of the choice whether
to become pregnant or increasing the risk of pregnancy is equally serious as a “significant risk of serious
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of the complainant’s consent. As a result, the majority upheld the conviction. The dissenting judgment
would have sent the case back for new trial to determine whether the consent of the complainant was
vitiated by fraud.
Justices Rothstein and Wagner concurring.
Hutchinson, supra note 33 at para 38. In fact, there is a significant difference between these cases. In
Hutchinson, the complainant believed she was agreeing to intercourse with a condom that had not been
sabotaged; in Cuerrier, the complainant agreed to intercourse without a condom.
Ibid at para 5.
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bodily harm” within the meaning of Cuerrier, and therefore suffices to establish fraud vitiating consent under
s. 265(3)(c).

141

Justices Abella and Moldaver penned the minority reasons with Justice Karakatsanis
concurring. The Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark decision in R. v. Ewanchuk had
established that whether consent exists is determined from the perspective of the
complainant.142 It is the complainant’s subjective state of mind that governs whether consent
was present at the time of the sexual activity. Consenting to protected sex is consenting to
a different sexual activity than consenting to unprotected sex, and consent in one context
cannot be transferred to the other. Whatever her reasons for wanting to use a condom, the
complainant did not agree to have sex with Hutchinson without a condom. That was her
decision to make. Therefore, there was no need to even consider whether Hutchinson’s
actions constituted fraud and no need to examine the risk of bodily harm:
A person consents to how she will be touched, and she is entitled to decide what sexual activity she agrees
to engage in for whatever reasons she wishes. The fact that some of the consequences of her motives are more
serious than others, such as pregnancy, does not in the slightest undermine her right to decide the manner of
143

the sexual activity she wants to engage in. It is neither her partner’s business nor the state’s.

The minority was careful to limit its judgment to the way in which a particular sexual
touching takes place and did not extend its reasoning to other contextual factors about a
sexual encounter that might influence a decision about whether to say yes or no to sex. A
man lying about his wealth, his marital status, or whether he has an STI would not negate
agreement to engage in the sexual act in question because such factors do not relate to that
physical act. These kinds of deceptions are not part of the how the physical touching is
carried out and, as a result, such deceptions would have to be dealt with under fraud and the
limit imposed by the requirement of a significant risk of serious bodily harm.
B.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF HUTCHINSON FOR FRAUD

Hutchinson narrows the concept of consent and correspondingly expands the range of
factors to be considered as part of the fraud inquiry. Cuerrier limits fraudulently induced
consent to circumstances where there is a significant risk of serious bodily harm. Deceptions
that do not risk serious bodily harm, however deliberate or calculated, are therefore now
entirely beyond the scope of criminal law. Thus, for example, men who have engaged in
elaborate schemes to trick multiple women into thinking they are auditioning for a modelling
or film contract cannot be convicted of sexual assault unless there was a risk of unwanted
pregnancy.144 Presumably, no amount of deception will constitute fraud where the sexual
141
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See R v Dadmand, 2016 BCSC 1565 [Dadmand]. Dadmand posed as a modelling agent working for a
prominent Italian modelling agency trying to persuade women to engage in auditions that would begin
with modelling clothes and develop into nude modelling and beyond. Dadmand presented the
complainants with a contract and took them to a home he said falsely was the home of another model
but was in fact his own home. The trial judge found that many of the complainants did not consent to
the actual sexual touching that took place and therefore found the accused guilty of sexual assault,
regardless of the deception. However, for one complainant, a young single mother living on social
assistance, the justice had a reasonable doubt that the complainant agreed to the sexual activity as part
of an audition. The trial judge acknowledged that the accused had deceived her into believing he was
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contact does not include vaginal intercourse unless there is a significant risk of STI
transmission. Fraud has been reduced to a risk of unwanted pregnancy or a risk of disease
transmission. By focusing fraud exclusively on the risk of physical harm, attention to the
harm of denying someone the autonomy to make their own choices about sex has been lost.
The majority’s concern about expanding HIV nondisclosure in Hutchinson was
unwarranted. The majority criticized the minority on the basis that HIV nondisclosure could
come within the minority’s definition of how the sexual activity takes place (that is, through
“the exchange of diseased fluids”).145 But the minority judgment was careful about
distinguishing between the manner in which the sexual activity was carried out and the
surrounding circumstances that might have influenced whether the complainant consented.
The former went to the definition of consent and the latter would go to fraud. Under the
minority, HIV nondisclosure prosecutions would have continued to be dealt with by fraud
because they did not relate to the manner in which the sexual activity was carried out but
rather to circumstances that might have influenced the complainant’s consent. Nor would the
minority include within the scope of nonconsent a woman who lies about whether she is on
the pill or using other birth control, something about which the majority had expressed
concern. In the minority’s view, whether a woman is on the pill does not go to the manner
in which the sexual activity is carried out. A lie about being on the pill can only be dealt with
through the doctrine of fraud and, because there is no significant risk of serious bodily harm
to a male partner, such a deception would not constitute fraud. Both judgments would
criminalize a man who deceived his sexual partner about whether he had had a vasectomy,
or other infertility, but only through the doctrine of fraud. Because the absence of a
vasectomy increases the risk of unwanted pregnancy, such an accused could be convicted of
sexual assault through fraud vitiating consent but presumably only if his sexual partner was
capable of becoming pregnant from the specific incident of sexual activity. Both the minority
and the majority judgments therefore raise the possibility that, in dealing with fraud relating
to male fertility, we will now require the Crown in such a scenario to prove that the
complainant was capable of becoming pregnant which has serious privacy implications for
complainants. While the Hutchinson minority is more coherent on consent, neither judgment
advances the law relating to fraud.146
One area where the different sets of reasons would lead to different outcomes is with the
practice of one male partner surreptitiously deciding to remove a condom during sexual
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an agent and induced her to have sex with him and to video record the sexual activity. In other words,
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activity in question. See ibid at paras 57–58.
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activity — a practice which has been dubbed “stealthing.”147 There is a whole online
subcommunity dedicated to stealthing, both for men who have sex with women and for men
who have sex with men.148 Certainly someone who has been subjected to this practice may
face extreme anxiety around possible pregnancy or possible transmission of an STI. But is
stealthing sexual assault? The majority and minority in Hutchinson would give a somewhat
different answer to this question. The majority judgment would say that stealthing could only
be sexual assault through the doctrine of fraud. Because fraud requires a significant risk of
bodily harm, it would only constitute sexual assault where the accused has an STI or where
the complainant faces a risk of unwanted pregnancy. Stealthing, according to the majority,
would not be criminalized for a man having sex with another man unless the person
removing the condom had an STI. The minority judgment, by contrast, would argue that
consent to engage in sex with a condom does not include within it consent to engage in sex
without a condom, regardless of the complainant’s reasons for wanting a condom. In other
words, stealthing would always constitute sexual assault regardless of the potential for
pregnancy or the possibility of acquiring an STI. The minority judgment would have given
all complainants the same right to insist on condom use, not just those who risk unwanted
pregnancy or STIs.
The only harm of deceptive sexual practices that the law will recognize, therefore, is the
risk of serious physical harm. As Lise Gotell has cogently argued, this is a significant
constriction on our understanding of affirmative consent and the notion that the complainant
gets to choose with whom she wants to engage in sexual activity and in what
circumstances.149
C.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF HUTCHINSON FOR CONSENT

The majority judgment in Hutchinson represents a clear retreat from the landmark decision
in Ewanchuk, which entrenched the affirmative consent standard in Canadian sexual assault
law and determined that consent needed to be assessed from the subjective perspective of the
complainant.150 In Hutchinson, the majority judgment begins by stating a principle from
Ewanchuk: “Control over the sexual activity one engages in lies at the core of human dignity
and autonomy,” thus apparently endorsing that decision.151 However, this misstates what the
Supreme Court in Ewanchuk actually said. In Ewanchuk, Justice Major in fact stated
“[h]aving control over who touches one’s body, and how, lies at the core of human dignity
and autonomy.”152 Through this sleight of hand, the “how” of sexual activity was removed
from our understanding of consent.
Furthermore, the two-step approach to consent in Hutchinson is an awkward fit with the
structure of the Criminal Code. The majority in Hutchinson was concerned that, if a broad
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approach were taken to voluntary agreement to “the sexual activity in question,” too much
of the conceptual work would be done by the consent inquiry in section 273.1(1), thus
leaving the fraud provisions of the Criminal Code redundant. However, the majority
judgment misconstrues the construction of the sexual assault provisions in the Criminal Code
by identifying the factors listed in section 273.1(2) as exceptions which vitiate an otherwise
valid consent, rather than as examples of situations where no voluntary agreement to the
sexual activity in question has been given. Section 273.1(1) of the Criminal Code defines
consent and 273.1(2) limits when consent is obtained in a number of ways. This latter
provision was designed to clarify circumstances in which no consent would be found:
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), no consent is obtained if
(a) the agreement is expressed by the words or conduct of a person other than the complainant;
(a.1) the complainant is unconscious;
(b) the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity for any reason other than the one referred
to in paragraph (a.1);
(c) the accused induces the complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a position of trust, power
or authority;
(d) the complainant expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to engage in the activity; or
(e) the complainant, having consented to engage in sexual activity, expresses, by words or conduct, a
lack of agreement to continue to engage in the activity.

153

Section 265(3), sets out further limits which apply to all assaults, sexual and otherwise:
(3) For the purposes of this section, no consent is obtained where the complainant submits or does not resist
by reason of
(a) the application of force to the complainant or to a person other than the complainant;
(b) threats or fear of the application of force to the complainant or to a person other than the
complainant;
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Criminal Code, supra note 11, s 273.1(2).
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(c) fraud; or
154

(d) the exercise of authority.

Recall what the majority in Hutchinson said about how these provisions operate:
The Criminal Code sets out a two-step process for analyzing consent to sexual activity. The first step is to
determine whether the evidence establishes that there was no “voluntary agreement of the complainant to
engage in the sexual activity in question” under s. 273.1(1). If the complainant consented, or her conduct
raises a reasonable doubt about the lack of consent, the second step is to consider whether there are any
155

circumstances that may vitiate her apparent consent.

I would argue that, with the possible exception of the revocation of consent that has
already been given, the factors listed in section 273.1(2) and section 265(3) are prerequisites
to consent, not ways to vitiate it once it has already been established as is suggested by the
Hutchinson majority. This is consistent with how then Justice Minister Kim Campbell
explained the provision to Parliament when it was introduced in 1992. Section 273.1(2)
“set[s] out circumstances where no consent is obtained.”156 This approach is consistent with
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s interpretation of section 265(3) in Cuerrier:
But s. 265(3) does not state simply that actions are unlawful if consent was obtained under vitiating
circumstances. Instead, s. 265(3) says that “no consent is obtained where the complainant submits or does
157

not resist” because of the presence of one of the enumerated factors.

The Hutchinson majority’s construction has problematic implications outside of the fraud
context. Consider the very common scenario where a complainant is intoxicated, short of
unconsciousness, and the question is whether she had the capacity to consent. We have
always thought of capacity as a prerequisite to consent: no capacity, no consent. Do we now
first have to decide whether she voluntarily agreed to engage in sex, and only then consider
whether she is in fact incapable of consenting? Under this analysis, all the work would be
done at the second stage of the analysis after a finding of voluntary agreement has been
made. But can someone who is incapable of consenting give voluntary agreement to engage
in sexual activity? If the answer is yes, then the word “voluntary” means nothing.158
Similarly, where capacity is at issue because of a mental disability, under this two-step
approach, there will be no consideration of the impact of mental disability until the
determination has been made about voluntary agreement even though that disability may be
deeply relevant to whether the complainant’s agreement was truly voluntary.159 One can see
how unworkable this is when one looks at unconsciousness as one of the recently added
factors under section 273.1(2). We do not ask whether the unconscious person voluntarily
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Cuerrier, supra note 1 at para 8 [emphasis in original].
In R v S (DG) (2004), 72 OR (3d) 223 (CA), aff’d 2005 SCC 36 [S (DG)], the complainant only agreed
to engage in sexual intercourse with the accused because he threatened that he would otherwise
disseminate nude photographs of the complainant. The Court of Appeal for Ontario held that these
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activity in question and the Supreme Court of Canada adopted these reasons.
See e.g. R c Owolabi Adejojo, 2019 QCCQ 570.
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agreed to the sexual activity in question and only then look at her unconsciousness to decide
whether that agreement was vitiated. An unconscious person cannot voluntarily agree. I
would argue that there can also be no voluntary agreement in the context of threats of
violence to the complainant or another person, or where there is an abuse of trust, power, or
authority.160 Agreement to participate in sex under threat of force or under an abuse of trust
is not a voluntary agreement. All of these factors must be considered when one is deciding
whether the agreement to the sexual activity in question was voluntary; these factors are not
afterthoughts which vitiate an otherwise valid consent.
We have already begun to see the implications of Hutchinson in the context of capacity
to consent. Recent scholarship has been critical of the minimalist approach to capacity to
consent in the context of sexual assault.161 Courts have required only a bare cognitive
capacity to understand that you are engaging in sexual activity and the ability to understand
that you have a choice. The result is that even extremely intoxicated women are often found
to be sufficiently capable of consenting. The law is clear that an unconscious woman is
incapable of consenting, but it is less clear where we draw the line of capacity for someone
whose cognitive capacity is severely impaired short of unconsciousness. In R. v. Al-Rawi,
a Halifax taxi driver was charged with sexually assaulting his very intoxicated female
passenger.162 The police found the accused taxi driver in the backseat of his cab, between the
complainant’s legs, with his pants open. The complainant was unconscious and naked from
the breasts down, her urine soaked underwear in the accused’s hands, roughly 11 minutes
after she had entered the taxi.163 The difficulty in this case was that the complainant was
unable to remember the events and the Crown could not prove when she lost consciousness.
The accused was acquitted by the trial judge stating the now infamous, but legally correct,
statement that “[c]learly, a drunk can consent.”164 The acquittal in Al-Rawi was overturned
by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal.165 The feminist organization, the Women’s Legal
Education and Action Fund (LEAF), had intervened on appeal to argue for a more rigorous
test for capacity that would include whether the woman was capable of understanding the
risks and benefits of sexual activity and whether she was capable of communicating
consent.166 The Court of Appeal rejected this argument relying on the HIV cases and the
decision in Hutchinson:
The proposed requirement that a complainant have the cognitive ability to appreciate and assess the risks and
consequences of the sexual act in question is contrary to the Supreme Court’s rejection in R. v. Cuerrier, R.
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See R v Snelgrove, 2018 NLCA 59, aff’d 2019 SCC 16, where one of the majority justices in the Court
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the other concurring minority, per Hoegg JA at para 52, was explicit that “it is not a question of vitiating
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2018 NSCA 10 [Al-Rawi].
See Grant & Benedet, supra note 161.
Al-Rawi, supra note 162 at para 109 (citing the trial judge) [emphasis omitted].
Ibid at para 123.
Al-Rawi, supra note 162 (Factum of the Intervenors – Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund Inc
and Avalon Sexual Assault Centre Society, online: <www.leaf.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/LEAFAl-Rawi-20171002-factum-of-the-intervenor.pdf>). In R v Barton, 2019 SCC 33 at para 118 [Barton],
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v. Mabior and R. v. Hutchinson that knowledge of the risks and consequences of the act are necessary
167

components of a valid consent.

In other words, Hutchinson and the HIV cases limited what can be included within the
scope of a valid consent and, if knowledge of the risks and consequences are not part of
consent, the ability to weigh those risks need not be a requirement of capacity. This finding
may have been based on a misunderstanding of LEAF’s position; it was not arguing that in
every case the complainant must weigh the consequences of sex or there will not be a valid
consent. The additional component of capacity does not require that the complainant actually
weigh the risks and benefits of sexual activity. It would only have required that she have the
basic cognitive capacity to do so if she so chooses. If she is not cognitively capable of
weighing the risks, then we rob her of the ability to make a decision as to whether to weigh
them. The point is that it should be up to the complainant to decide whether to weigh those
risks. How can we claim that the law respects the complainant’s autonomy and dignity if we
can make a finding of consent where she was not capable of weighing the risks and benefits?
After Al-Rawi, in 2018, the federal government introduced legislation to amend section
273.1(2) of the Criminal Code which, as indicated above, now provides that no consent is
obtained where the complainant is unconscious or where she is incapable of consenting for
any other reason.168 Feminist groups lobbied the government not to pass this law because it
creates a risk that a court might assume that if an intoxicated woman is anything short of
unconscious, she must be capable of consenting.169 Senator Kim Pate introduced amendments
to the Bill that would have incorporated a definition of capacity consistent with that sought
by LEAF in Al-Rawi and that would have included the ability to weigh the risks and benefits
of engaging in sex as well as the ability to communicate consent.170 Then Minister of Justice
Jody Wilson-Raybould rejected these amendments and the law passed as described above.
Feminists continued their lobbying efforts, pressuring the new Minister of Justice, David
Lametti, to reconsider the amendments passed by the Senate. Two round tables were held on
the capacity issue, and HIV advocacy groups, whose expertise on sexual assault law is
derived from the context of HIV nondisclosure prosecutions, opposed expanding the factors
going to capacity for reasons similar to Hutchinson — a fear that any strengthening of the
protections around capacity would impact the definition of consent in ways that could
167
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Al-Rawi, supra note 162 at para 38.
See An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Department of Justice Act and to make consequential
amendments to another Act, SC 2018, c 29, s 19.
See Isabel Grant & Elizabeth Sheehy, “Submission to the Senate Committee Studying Bill C-51,”
online: <sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/421/LCJC/Briefs/GrantandSheehy.Submissions_e.pdf>;
Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund, “Submission to the House of Commons Standing
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Bill C-51: An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the
Department of Justice Act and to make consequential amendments to another Act,” online: <www.our
commons.ca/Content/Committee/421/JUST/Brief/BR9225134/br-external/WomensLegalEducation
AndActionFund-e.pdf>.
The Senate amendments, which were ultimately rejected, would have amended section 273.1(2)(b). See
Debates of the Senate, 42-1, Vol 150, No 241 (30 October 2018) at 6635, online: <sencanada.ca/
Content/SEN/Chamber/421/Debates/pdf/241db_2018-10-30-e.pdf> as follows:
(b) the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity in question for any reason,
including, but not limited to, the fact that they are
(i) unable to understand the nature, circumstances, risks and consequences of the sexual
activity in question,
(ii) unable to understand that they have the choice to engage in the sexual activity in
question or not, or
(iii) unable to affirmatively express agreement to the sexual activity in question by words
or by active conduct.
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facilitate prosecution of HIV nondisclosure without the doctrine of fraud. If capacity required
an ability to weigh the risks and consequences, this argument goes, it would only be a small
jump to argue that consent itself must include an actual weighing of the risks and
consequences which could include the risk of HIV transmission. This is the same logical leap
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal made in Al-Rawi, assuming that a finding that capacity
includes the ability to weigh risks and benefits necessarily means that a person must have
actually done so before her consent will be valid.
Perhaps the most troublesome application of Hutchinson we have seen to date in the
context of consent was in an argument at the Supreme Court of Canada in Barton.171 The
Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario intervened to argue, relying entirely on
Hutchinson, that the “sexual activity in question” does not include the complainant having
to agree to the amount of force being used to carry out the particular activity. The
Association argued that Hutchinson holds that “[c]onsent to the ‘sexual activity in question’
under s. 273.1 only requires agreement to the basic physical act, not the precise manner in
which the act is carried out.”172 Barton involved the death of a young Indigenous woman
after the accused thrust his entire fist into her vagina causing a grave injury from which she
bled to death. The Supreme Court of Canada avoided the issue, but the potential for this
argument after Hutchinson is deeply troubling. A woman who consents to intercourse, for
example, is not consenting to any amount of force that her partner unilaterally decides to use.
This reasoning is particularly dangerous in the context of coercively controlling relationships
where sexual violence often plays a significant role.173 Consent must require consent to the
force used.174 Where the amount of force used changes over the course of sexual activity, that
consent must be ongoing. The interveners were correct that the Hutchinson majority did not
address the degree of force used as part of the sexual activity in question, but the decision
should not be taken as authority for that point since it was not at issue in Hutchinson. If, in
fact, the majority did intend to make the degree of force irrelevant to consent, it must be
urgently overturned legislatively.
Lower courts have struggled to make sense of Hutchinson in cases involving
nonconsensual condom removal or refusal to wear a condom.175 Most notably, the Court of
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highly contested. See R v Zhao, 2013 ONCA 293, where the Court held that consent would be negated
where the accused intended to and did cause bodily harm. In R v DK, 2020 ONCA 79 at para 23, the
Court of Appeal for Ontario made a distinction between cases where bodily harm is caused during
nonconsensual sex and cases where consent is vitiated through the intentional infliction of bodily harm,
holding that it is only in the latter cases where the Crown must prove that the bodily harm was
intentional. Recently, a movement in England, by a group entitled “We Can’t Consent to This,”
successfully advocated for the inclusion of a clause in the Domestic Abuse Bill [HL] (UK), 2019–2021
Sess, Bill 124 (1st reading 7 July 2020) that will amend the law such that it is not a defence that a victim
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See e.g. the text accompanying note 143 for a more detailed discussion of these cases (Dadmand, Lupi,
and Rivera). See Lise Gotell & Isabel Grant, “Does ‘No, Not without a Condom’ Mean ‘Yes, Even
Without a Condom’?: The Fallout from R v Hutchinson” (2020) 43:2 Dal LJ 747, online: <digital
commons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj/vol43/iss2/1/>.
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Appeal for British Columbia has recently distinguished Hutchinson in order to conclude that
whether a condom was used does in fact constitute part of the “sexual activity in question.”
In Kirkpatrick, the accused and the complainant initially met online.176 When they met in
person, the complainant told the accused she would only consent to intercourse with a
condom.177 A few days later, they had consensual sexual intercourse and, at her insistence,
used a condom. Later that evening, the complainant awoke from sleep to find the accused
sexually aroused. He reached over to a drawer from which he had retrieved a condom earlier
that night and then proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. It was only after he
ejaculated that the complainant realized he had not worn a condom.178 The complainant went
to the hospital and undertook a month of HIV prophylactics from which she suffered serious
side effects.179 The trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal on the basis that Hutchinson
provides that condom use does not go to the voluntary agreement to the sexual activity in
question and that there was no evidence of an actual deception which could constitute fraud
vitiating consent. Rather, there had been a misunderstanding about whether Kirkpatrick was
using a condom.180
A majority of the Court of Appeal held that the complainant did not consent to the sexual
activity in question because she only agreed to participate in sexual intercourse with a
condom, a conclusion that the minority judgment of Justice Bennett stressed was in direct
conflict with Hutchinson.181 Justice Groberman, for the majority, distinguished Hutchinson
on the basis that where an accused surreptitiously sabotages a condom (Hutchinson), the case
should be dealt with by fraud whereas if an accused refuses to wear a condom where the
complainant has insisted on it (Kirkpatrick), there is no agreement to the sexual activity in
question. According to the majority, a reading of Hutchinson which excludes condom use
from “the sexual activity in question” “would leave the law of Canada seriously out of touch
with reality, and dysfunctional in terms of its protection of sexual autonomy.”182
I have argued elsewhere that the distinction between condom refusal and condom sabotage
is tenuous and that either condom use is relevant to the sexual activity in question or it is
not.183 Justice Bennett is correct that the Supreme Court of Canada unambiguously held that
condom use does not go to the sexual activity in question. In fact, the majority in Hutchinson
stated this explicitly: “[e]ffective condom use is a method of contraception and protection
against sexually transmitted disease; it is not a sex act.”184 Justice Groberman, however, is
correct in stating that this conclusion leaves our law dysfunctional in terms of its protection
of sexual autonomy. The defence in Kirkpatrick has sought leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada which provides the Supreme Court with an opportunity to retreat from an
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approach that was correctly described as “out of touch with reality”185 and even “perverse”186
by the Court of Appeal in Kirkpatrick.
IV. MOVING FORWARD
Cuerrier has left us with two distinct problems to solve: the overcriminalization of people
with HIV and the damage done to the law of sexual assault and to our understanding of
consent. On the HIV front, Parliament has thus far abdicated its responsibility for legislating
crimes in this area to the courts and, as documented above, the Supreme Court of Canada has
not exactly risen to the occasion. Cuerrier created a “legal no-man’s-land”187 and Mabior has
only made things worse by expanding the scope of criminalization to situations where there
is no real risk of transmission, let alone transmission itself. On the sexual assault front,
Hutchinson has left us with a weak definition of consent that does not allow people to
determine the circumstances in which they are willing to engage in sexual activity.
A.

LIMITING HIV NONDISCLOSURE PROSECUTIONS

There are sound policy reasons for limiting the scope of HIV nondisclosure prosecutions
to those where transmission takes place. These prosecutions target only members of a highly
marginalized group — people with HIV — for criminalization. Very often, these accused
persons have intersecting inequalities that have shaped their lives in profound ways.188
They are disproportionately Black189 or Indigenous.190 Indigenous women, in particular, are
disproportionately impacted by HIV.191 The line between perpetrator and victim is not nearly
as clear as media coverage might suggest. Some of these accused persons themselves
acquired HIV from the nondisclosure of partners192 or through sexual violence.193 The threat
of criminalization hangs over the lives of people with HIV who are already dealing with
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significant challenges around disclosure.194 We know that disclosure can trigger violence,
particularly against women with HIV.195 Women with HIV may well not be in a position to
safely insist on condom use particularly in the context of violent relationships or those in the
sex trade.196 We have already seen a woman prosecuted in Canada because her violent expartner wanted retribution for her reporting his violence to police.197 Women with HIV may
also fear the risk of being charged for not disclosing to men who are sexually assaulting
them.198
Canada has the dubious distinction of being a world leader in the prosecution of HIV
nondisclosure. In a study of cases in 49 countries between October 2015 and December
2018, Canada ranked fifth in terms of the absolute number of prosecutions, behind mostly
countries with much larger populations.199 According to a 2015 study, Canada then ranked
second only to the United States.200 The stigma historically associated with HIV/AIDS and
the groups at highest risk continues to influence prosecutorial decision-making. Aggravated
sexual assault is rarely charged outside of the HIV context. The fact that we still prosecute
this crime where an HIV-positive person consistently uses a condom for intercourse201 and
where the risk of transmission is virtually none,202 demonstrates the degree to which the
criminalization of HIV nondisclosure is really about the criminalization of being HIVpositive. Despite the fact that HIV is much more difficult to transmit than most viruses, and
that most transmission takes place before the individual knows he or she is HIV-positive,203
there is no other disease in Canada that has been exceptionalized through criminal
prosecution in this way.204
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These compelling reasons to limit the scope of prosecutions for HIV nondisclosure do not
apply to sexual assault more generally. Sexual assault is a profoundly under-reported and
under-prosecuted crime.205 Conviction rates outside of the HIV context are low compared to
other violent crimes.206 Already marginalized populations tend to be targeted for sexual
assault such as, for example, Indigenous women and girls207 and those with disabilities.208
I recognize that my position could be criticized for being inconsistent if considered from
a doctrinal perspective. On the one hand, I support excluding cases of HIV nondisclosure
from the doctrine of fraud vitiating consent and prosecuting HIV nondisclosure under other
crimes, such as criminal negligence causing bodily harm, but only where the virus is
transmitted. On the other hand, I am urging that we take an approach to fraud that shifts the
focus to the nature of the deception and its role in inducing consent rather than its physical
consequences. Why would HIV nondisclosure not then always be fraud if the accused is
tricking the complainant into consenting by lying about something she would consider highly
relevant to her decision? It is important to acknowledge that my recommendations about HIV
nondisclosure are not based primarily on doctrinal concerns but rather on the damage
nondisclosure criminalization has caused both to a highly marginalized group of people and
to the law of sexual assault. Our most serious sexual offence is simply not the way to manage
a serious public health issue except in the most extraordinary circumstances. Quite simply,
prosecuting HIV nondisclosure in this way has done more harm than good. Where the virus
is not transmitted, prosecutions need to stop.
There are several ways to reduce HIV nondisclosure prosecutions. Robust prosecutorial
guidelines in every province could limit prosecution to cases where the virus has been
transmitted.209 This is already the approach we take to crimes based on criminal negligence
in Canada. Criminal negligence, or conduct that “shows wanton or reckless disregard for the
lives or safety of other persons,”210 is only criminalized where it leads to bodily harm or
death.211 In most nondisclosure cases, the accused is not setting out to injure their partner, but
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See Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, “Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with Mental
Disabilities: Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief” (2007) 52:2 McGill LJ 243.
Prosecutorial guidelines in Ontario and British Columbia reflect the emerging science on viral load but
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rather showing what could be described as a wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of
that partner if no condom is used by an accused who does not have a low viral load. In the
rare case where someone actually sets out to transmit the virus, and in fact does so, there are
more serious charges that can, and are, being utilized.212
I recognize that transmission might be said to be a matter of luck and is not necessarily
reflective of the accused’s moral blameworthiness. This is often true for consequence crimes
where the harm to the victim is based on factors outside of the accused’s control such as
access to prompt medical care. However, there is a connection between transmission and
moral blameworthiness. Where the accused has taken steps to protect his or her partner, such
as through careful use of a condom or a reduced viral load through treatment, transmission
almost certainly will not take place. In this respect, transmission is a proxy for condom use
and viral load. A person who does not disclose will then bear the risk of transmission taking
place. Alternatively, Parliament could enact something similar to its pre-1985 law that
criminalized only the transmission of an STI. This provision was entirely independent of
sexual assault, was a summary conviction offence punishable by up to six months of
incarceration and only criminalized actual transmission. HIV nondisclosure should be
explicitly removed from fraud through legislative reform.
While these recommendations might improve the state of HIV nondisclosure prosecutions,
they do not undo the damage that has been done to sexual assault law. The more difficult
question is whether we can make these changes without causing irrevocable damage to the
law of sexual assault.
B.

REPAIRING THE DAMAGE DONE TO SEXUAL ASSAULT LAW

The retreat from Ewanchuk that has resulted from concerns around HIV nondisclosure
prosecutions should also be dealt with legislatively. In Barton, the Supreme Court of Canada
had an opportunity to depart from, or at least limit, Hutchinson but declined to do so. The
Criminal Code should therefore be amended so that “voluntary agreement to the sexual
activity in question” explicitly includes how the sexual activity is undertaken as well as the
degree and type of force involved. It should also be made clear that voluntary agreement
must be ongoing and must apply to each sexual activity in question. This change would make
it unnecessary to have a specific provision dealing with revocation of consent once we
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See e.g. R v Boone, 2016 ONSC 1626. The accused was convicted of, among other things, three counts
of attempted murder. The trial judge’s description of the accused, at para 2, demonstrates how rare this
case is likely to be:
This is … more than an HIV non-disclosure case. It is about someone who first deliberately set out
to contract HIV and upon learning of his HIV positive status, refused to take antiretroviral
medication, notwithstanding his elevated viral load scores. Mr. Boone then preyed upon young
men, whom he believed to be HIV negative, with the intent of infecting them with HIV.
In allowing the attempted murder charges to go forward, the Court of Appeal in R v Boone, 2012 ONCA
539 at para 36, stated:
If the appellant believed that by infecting his sexual partners his conduct would, in the absence of
intervening circumstances that might cause their death, inevitably kill them, in my view, it would
be open to a trier of fact to find that he possessed a specific intent to kill. In such circumstances,
the fact that death might not ensue for many years would be irrelevant.
However, in R v Boone, 2019 ONCA 652 at para 60, the Court of Appeal ultimately allowed a new trial
on the charges of attempted murder because the trial judge had failed to make clear that the accused had
to both intend to transmit HIV and believe that death was a virtually certain consequence of transmitting
the virus in order to satisfy the mens rea of attempted murder.
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recognize the ongoing nature of consent and the requirement for consent to each act. A
further amendment should clarify that the factors in section 273.1(2) (excluding the
revocation provision which could be repealed) go to the definition of voluntary agreement
to the sexual activity in question and are not factors that vitiate an otherwise valid consent.
A person cannot voluntarily agree to the sexual activity in question where that agreement is
induced by an abuse of trust, power, or authority nor if she lacks the capacity to give consent.
None of these suggestions are radical and most of them were thought to be the law prior to
the decision in Hutchinson.213
Undoing the harm done to the concept of fraud is the most difficult task in light of
Cuerrier and Hutchinson. Strengthening the definition of consent, as suggested above, would
reduce the scope of fraud because more work could be done at the stage of consent. A robust
definition of consent both in terms of the content of voluntariness and the content of “the
sexual activity in question” reduces the importance of factors that vitiate that consent. The
condom cases, for example, could be dealt with exclusively under the definition of consent.
Someone like Hutchinson, or someone who surreptitiously removes a condom, would be
convicted because the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity in question, not
through the doctrine of fraud. Troublesome distinctions about whether the victim was
capable of becoming pregnant would be unnecessary.
The precise scope of fraud has been the subject of considerable scholarly debate and is a
complex subject that warrants its own article.214 My own view is that we need to work out
a test for fraud that fully acknowledges the nature of the deception and its role in inducing
consent. Fraud should include someone who develops an elaborate ruse for the sole purpose
of tricking women into thinking they are auditioning for a film215 or who tricks a woman into
agreeing to sex through a false promise of payment.216 It is the centrality of these deceptions
to the consent decision that warrants bringing them within the scope of fraud.217
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While it is important to develop a test that does not criminalize trivial deceptions, this
danger should not be overstated. Justice McLachlin, as she was then, in Cuerrier cautioned
against a broad definition of fraud that might include a woman wearing “alluring make-up”
or a man’s “false moustache.”218 These examples are insulting to those who are concerned
about sexual violence and are part of an exaggeration tactic sometimes used to create
unnecessary concern about the potential for overcriminalization through sexual assault.219 Yet
the approach to fraud taken by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in Cuerrier may need further limits.
For example, under the L’Heureux-Dubé test, a woman who lies about being on the pill or
having an intrauterine device could be convicted of sexual assault through fraud, if the
Crown could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant would not otherwise
have consented.
We could consider a requirement that the deception be explicit before it can be vitiated,220
a position rejected by the courts in the HIV context where lies about STIs have been equated
with saying nothing.221 The causal connection requirement is also likely to be more
meaningful outside of the context of disease transmission. In other words, the Crown burden
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant would not have consented
otherwise, and that the accused knew that, will be more difficult when the potentially serious
consequence of acquiring HIV is off the table. While some limits may be necessary, the test
from Justice L’Heureux-Dubé is at least a starting point for thinking about an approach to
fraud that recognizes more than the physical harm from deceptive sex.
In 1998, Cuerrier inexorably linked the development of HIV nondisclosure prosecutions
with the crime of sexual assault. The result has been the overcriminalization of people with
HIV and the distortion of the law of sexual assault in ways that limit sexual autonomy for
complainants. In order to right the ship, it is time to sever the link between these two distinct
social problems.
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Cuerrier, supra note 1 at para 52.
Perhaps the most notable example of this fear tactic is in the dissenting judgment in R v JA, 2011 SCC
28 at para 74, where the concern was raised that prohibiting advanced consent to sexual activity would
result in criminalizing someone who gives their sleeping partner a kiss. Needless to say, we have not
seen cases where sexual assault has been charged as a result of a kiss to a sleeping spouse.
See Joseph J Fischel, Screw Consent: A Better Politics of Sexual Justice (Oakland: University of
California Press, 2019) at 111–12. In Chapter 3 “The Trouble with Transgender ‘Rapists,’” Fischel
argues that there is a distinction between conditions that are made explicit and those that are not.
See Cuerrier, supra note 1 at para 126.
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